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Letter to the Editor 
The Limb Limps: A Response to Eric Scerri 
by Thomas Vogt 
I do not agree with Scerri’s claim that it does not matter whether a scientist is 
right or wrong. In the next paragraph in his response to my book review 
(Vogt 2017) he acknowledges that “The new idea, theory, and so on will then 
be subjected to experimental tests and will either stand or fall” (Scerri 2018). 
Isn’t that judging the theory, model, or experiment right or wrong? Scerri 
uses a biological analogy of the growth of a new limb and states: “My point is 
that one would not regard such a development as being right or wrong. What 
one might say is that if the limb confers an evolutionary advantage to the 
species then its members will continue to reproduce and flourish.” If the role 
of “the environment in the case of biological growth is now played by the 
realm of experimentation”, as he states then, why not judge such a develop-
ment and those who created it as right or wrong? Scerri writes: “By denying 
that a particular scientist is right or wrong I am not denying that science as a 
whole might have arrived at the best possible description of the world at any 
particular epoch.” We can describe the world today without evoking the ex-
perimentally debunked concept of ‘cold fusion’, but should we ‘deny’ that 
the two electrochemists Fleischmann and Pons were wrong? The important 
self-correcting epistemology of science relies on ‘judging the limb’ in the 
light of empirical evidence, logical or mathematical errors. It is dangerous to 
overburden scientific theories and models with non-empirical, metaphysical 
ontic biases such as beauty, harmony, simplicity, and in Scerri’s case ‘organ-
ic’. 
 Scerri claims that I “fully support the standard Kuhnian line” and correct-
ly states that I regard the ‘isotope crisis’ at the beginning of the 20th century 
as a scientific revolution. I agree with Brad Wray that changes in science can 
be both evolutionary and revolutionary and invoked the metaphor of ‘punc-
tuated equilibrium’ in my review. In his review of Scerri’s book Brad Wray 
(2017) also cites the ‘isotope crisis’ as an example of a revolutionary change 
of theory: 
Intimately tied with this discovery of the significance of atomic number as key 
to classifying chemical elements was the discovery of isotopes, variants of the 
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same element that had different atomic weights. Importantly, such ‘things’ 
were incompatible with the earlier way of classifying elements. That is, if ele-
ments are identified by their atomic weight, then no two samples of the same 
chemical elements can differ in their atomic weights. So, even though, the pro-
cess by which various important discoveries that contributed to this change of 
theory are aptly described as evolutionary in nature, the net result is aptly de-
scribed as revolutionary.  
To emphasize the importance of perspective when judging evolutionary and 
revolutionary scientific changes, Brad Wray reminds us of Kuhn’s allegorical 
question whether the bend in the road belongs to the road leading up to it or 
after it. To convey a similar point I had used Bohr’s statement that when we 
understand quantum mechanics our meaning of understanding has also 
changed. Many revolutionary ideas in science are put forward reluctantly and 
their impact grows with time as others use them and build the ‘road after the 
bend’. Brad Wray, whom Scerri attempts to enlist for his position on evolu-
tionary epistemology, recently wrote an article in which he unequivocally 
states that the ‘isotope crisis’ is “a classic case of a Kuhnian revolution” (Brad 
2018). 
 Despite the fact that both the periodic system and chemical elements are 
– as Kragh (2000) writes and Scerri re-emphasizes – “conceptually robust 
chemical entities” and point “to the value of retaining older theoretical no-
tions, at least in a correspondence-like manner and up to a point”, a radical 
redefinition of chemical elements away from Cannizzaro and Dalton’s ‘same 
mass’ to Moseley, Paneth, Hevesy, and Van den Broek’s ‘same nuclear 
charge’ qualifier occurred. This new paradigm disbanded with the one-to-one 
correspondence between atoms and chemical elements and introduced a de-
gree of physical heterogeneity that some chemists (i.e. Fajans) at that time 
resisted since important quantities in thermodynamics such as entropy and 
specific heat depend on mass. In his article Kragh also recalls the discovery of 
a monoatomic gas with atomic weight near 39.8 a.u. which resulted in what 
Kuhn would call initially an ‘anomaly’ and became an ‘incommensurability’ as 
it called for abandoning either the kinetic gas theory or the period table. The 
‘conceptually robust’ periodic table after the isotope crisis now has eight 
groups and the ‘trouble maker’ Argon turned into the ‘poster child’ of the 
new periodic table and the re-definition of a chemical element. Other 
‘Kuhnian anomalies’ such as the positioning of Te-I and Co-Ni in the period-
ic table are mentioned in Wray 2017. Scerri’s reading of Kragh’s article, “So 
much for the occurrence of Kuhnian gestalt switches or anything of the 
kind”, should be contrasted by his own writing regarding the complications 
assessing how many elements are missing in the mass-based periodic table 
(Scerri 2011, p. 80): 
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This complication disappeared when the switch was made to using atomic 
number. Now the gaps between successive elements became perfectly regular, 
namely one unit of atomic number.”  
Switch – another façon de parler I assume? In conclusion, I agree with Brad 
Wray (2017) that “there are significant disruptions in science, disruptions 
that truly warrant being described as revolutionary” and that the reconceptu-
alization of the chemical element was such a scientific revolution despite 
maintaining “robust chemical concepts”. Einstein’s reconceptualization of 
mass in special and general relativity did not get rid of mass conceptually but 
radically distinguished it from Newton’s concept. Therefore I still regard 
Bohr’s statement that as we gain new understanding (and of course not just 
in quantum mechanics!) our meaning of understanding also changes as a 
good litmus test for a scientific revolution. We radically changed our chemi-
cal vocabulary with the concept of isotopy and did more than merely ‘grow a 
limb’. 
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